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The paper discusses the risks and challenges faced by the new members on the road to the 
euro and the strategies for and timing of euro adoption. We investigate the real-nominal 
convergence nexus from the perspective of euro area entry. We argue that the initial level of 
economic development as measured by per capita income and the speed of real convergence 
have a bearing on the strategies to follow and on the timing of entry into euro area. This is 
because the lower is the per capita income, the larger is the price level gap to close and the 
greater is the danger of credit booms and overheating. We argue that inflation targeting with 
floating rates is better suited than hard pegs to manage the price level catching-up process. 
We suggest a modification in the Maastricht inflation criterion which as currently defined has 
lost its economic logic. 
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Az euróövezet bővítése és euróbevezetési stratégiák 




Tanulmányunk azokat a kockázatokat és kihívásokat vizsgálja, amelyekkel az új EU-
tagállamok szembesülnek az euróhoz vezető úton, valamint elemzi az euró bevezetésével és a 
bevezetés időzítésével kapcsolatos stratégiákat is. Megvizsgáljuk a reál- és 
nominálkonvergencia kapcsolatát az euróövezetbe csatlakozás szemszögéből. Véleményünk 
szerint a gazdaság egy főre jutó jövedelemben mért kezdeti fejlettségi szintje, valamint a 
reálkonvergencia sebessége kihatnak a követendő stratégiákra és a belépés időzítésére. Minél 
alacsonyabb ugyanis egy ország egy főre jutó jövedelme, annál nagyobb az árszínvonalbeli 
lemaradása (amit be kell hoznia), és az új tagok jelenlegi helyzetét figyelembe véve, annál 
nagyobb a veszélye annak, hogy a hitelek növekedése túlzottá, a gazdaság túlfűtötté válik. Úgy 
gondoljuk, hogy az inflációkövetés lebegő árfolyam mellett megfelelőbb az árszínvonal 
felzárkózási folyamatának kezelésére, mint valamilyen merev árfolyamrögzítés. Elemezzük a 
maastrichti kritériumokat az új EU-tagállamok gazdasági jellemzőinek szempontjából, és az 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The twelve new Member States (NMS) which joined the EU since 2004 do not have an opt-
out like Denmark and the United Kingdom and have to adopt the euro under the Treaty. The 
timing of euro adoption depends on satisfying the Maastricht requirements of nominal 
convergence. The benefits of a currency union, in general, and of the adoption of the euro by 
the EU Member States, in particular, have been widely discussed in the literature. Suffice 
here to recall the main ones. By eliminating exchange rate fluctuations and the associated 
uncertainty and transaction costs, a currency union promotes trade and financial integration. 
Furthermore, it enhances price transparency and hence competition. For the NMS, 
membership in the euro area could also permit to import credibility to the extent that the 
credibility of the single monetary policy is regarded as greater than the monetary policy of the 
individual country. Finally, the drive towards euro adoption and the attendant desire to make 
real and nominal convergence sustainable may promote reforms, for instance in the areas of 
fiscal institutions and transparency, deregulation, incomes policy, etc.  All these benefits can 
lead to higher growth and better living standards for the society as a whole. 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the following issues: (i) given the characteristics and 
initial conditions of the NMS, what are the risks and challenges on the road to euro and after 
euro adoption; and (ii) what should be the strategy for and the timing of adoption of the euro.  
To this end, we investigate the real-nominal convergence nexus during the catching-up 
process, as it has a bearing on the strategies to adopt, including the choice of exchange rate 
regime, and the timing of euro adoption. We demonstrate that the initial level of 
development of a country measured by its GDP per capita and the speed of real convergence 
are the main determinants of the price level convergence and hence of the relative inflation in 
the long-run, which also depends on the exchange rate regime. The countries with the lowest 
per capita income have the largest initial price level gap to close. The less developed NMS had 
also the lowest initial level of credit to GDP ratio and hence the greatest potential for credit 
booms as credit converges toward its equilibrium level. The key issue then is whether, taking 
into account the initial level of development, the convergence process of the price level  can 
be better managed inside or outside the monetary union and, by implication, whether the 
transition to the euro can be  better managed with a floating or with a fixed exchange rate 
regime.  
What is the most appropriate monetary-cum-exchange rate regime to best manage the 
catching-up process is a complex issue. We argue in this chapter that the main risks for the 
NMS with hard pegs is that with no room to let the nominal exchange rate appreciate to 
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accommodate the price level convergence and with little or no risk premia, the real interest 
rates become excessively low due to higher inflation. This carries the danger of credit booms 
and can lead to large external account imbalances. Such developments have taken place in 
the Baltic countries recently. 
For the inflation targeting countries with floating exchange rates, the possibility of letting 
the nominal exchange rate appreciate provides somewhat more flexibility to control inflation 
and accommodate price level convergence, but the room for manoeuvre should not be over 
estimated. This is because owing to the high degree of financial integration of the NMS and 
euro area entry expectation driven capital inflows, the effectiveness of domestic monetary 
policy is constrained.  
An issue related to the real convergence process is whether the Maastricht criteria of 
inflation and exchange rate stability laid down 15 years ago or so for a group of countries with 
less divergent levels of economic development can be reconciled with the lesser degree of real 
convergence of most of the new members. Or to put it differently, whether these criteria are 
such that they unavoidably will keep out of the monetary union countries which will have 
already reached a stage where they could function normally in the euro area and reap the 
benefits of membership. We suggest a modification of the Maastricht inflation criterion 
which as currently defined has lost its economic logic. 
It is necessary to mention what this chapter does not study. It does not investigate to 
what extent the NMS satisfy the optimum currency area (OCA) criteria. Satisfying these 
criteria is a key condition for joining a monetary union. In a longer version of this chapter 
(Darvas and Szapáry, 2008), we investigated in detail  this issue and conclude that the NMS 
are not in a worse position - and in some cases are even in a better position - to join the 
monetary union than were the old members when they adopted the euro.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews some of the most relevant 
economic features of the NMS from the perspective of euro adoption. Section III discusses 
the risks, challenges and the long term strategies on the road to euro. In the light of these 
challenges, Section IV considers the strategies and timing for euro adoption. Section VI 
concludes.1
 
                                                        
1 We include among the new member states Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia which 
already joined the euro area. Therefore, when we talk about the euro area, we refer to the 12 
old euro area members (EA12). 
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2. ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE NMS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EURO 
ADOPTION 
2.1 THE REAL-NOMINAL CONVERGENCE NEXUS: LARGE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE 
NEW MEMBERS 
 
A salient feature of the economic developments of the new members is their catching up in 
terms of GDP per capita and the associated price level convergence (Graphs 1 and 2). A well 
established fact in economic theory is that richer countries tend to have higher price levels 
expressed in a same currency and therefore the overall inflation rate in the catching-up 
countries is higher and/or their nominal exchange rate appreciates as they close the gap.  
The key theoretical underpinning of price level convergence is the Balassa-Samuelson 
(BS) effect. If the higher inflation is due to the BS effect, i.e., to the faster productivity growth 
in the NMS, then the implied real appreciation of the exchange rate is competitiveness 
neutral, an important consideration once a country has adopted the euro. Égert (2007) 
presents a recent update of the size of the BS effect and finds that relative to the euro area 
the BS effect in the NMS ranges between zero or a negative value and 1.2%. While the BS 
effect undoubtedly does explain part of the price level convergence between countries of 
different levels of development, its conventional measurement has a number of weaknesses 
and there are a number of other factors as well to be considered when assessing the likely 
influence of the BS effect on price convergence in the years ahead (Darvas and Szapáry, 
2008). Furthermore, transitory factors, such as for instance overheating, can also affect the 
actual speed of price level increases. 
Since the price level convergence is inherent to the catching-up process,  countries 
experiencing high growth rates, such as most of the NMS, are unlikely to achieve 
simultaneously a stable nominal exchange rate and a low level of inflation, at least until a 
certain degree of price level convergence has already been reached. 
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Graph 1. 
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Sources: Eurostat for 1995-2007; 2008 values were calculated by us using domestic and 
EA12 inflation and euro exchange rate changes. Note: Values shown correspond to 
comparative price levels of final consumption by private households including indirect taxes 
(EA12 = 100) 
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The five countries with the lowest relative per capita GDP in 1995 are the three Baltic 
States, Bulgaria and Romania. Even in recent years, these countries recorded the fastest 
annual rates of growth of GDP, the fastest credit growth, the largest current account deficits, 
the most rapid wage increases and four of them had the highest inflation if we abstract from 
Hungary where inflation has been recently boosted by tax increases and administrative price 
adjustment to deal with a runaway fiscal deficit. Those five countries had also the lowest 
starting price level in the mid-1990s (except Estonia) and the lowest credit/GDP ratios 
(Graph 3). Four of those countries have been operating under fixed exchange rate 
arrangements, but Romania has had a floating rate. 
 
Graph 3.  
















































































Source: IMF, IFS. Note: Values for 2007 are projections by us using data of 2007Q3 
for most of the countries and 2007Q2 for some of the countries. 
 
If we look at the four NMS with the highest relative per capita GDP in 1995, i.e., Cyprus, 
Malta, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, they recorded lower output growth, slower credit 
expansion, smaller current account deficits, and lower wage growth and inflation in recent 
years. Two of these countries, Cyprus and Malta, had fixed rates, the Czech Republic had a 
floating rate and Slovenia was under a tightly managed float, with practically a fixed rate in 
more recent years.  The three countries in the middle of the rankings in terms of GDP per 
capita (Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) also recorded, compared to the five countries in the 
bottom of the rankings, slower output growth (except Slovakia), smaller credit expansion, 
lower current account deficits and lower inflation (except Hungary as noted). All three 
countries had floating rates. 
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Looking at the evolution of nominal exchange rates since the mid-1990s of those six 
countries which had floating rates,2 we see a mixed picture (Graph 4). Only in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia has the nominal exchange rate been on a fairly strong appreciating 
trend since the mid-1990s. These two countries, which had the lowest price levels among the 
more developed central and eastern European countries (CEEs) in the mid-1990s, are also 
among the countries which have registered the lowest inflation in recent years. 
The economy wide unit labour cost (ULC)-based real effective exchange rates is another 
representation of the catching-up phenomenon. The three more developed countries have 
registered much less appreciations between 1995 and 2007 than the less developed ones, 
with the ULC-based real exchange rate of Slovenia actually stagnating (Graph 5). The largest 
appreciations took place in Romania (180%) and Lithuania (140%). On the other hand, the 
appreciation was only 20% in Bulgaria. In the rest of the less developed CEEs, the 
appreciations ranged between 60% and 90%. 
                                                        
2 The NMS have maintained different exchange systems over time and have also changed 
regimes on occasion. The regimes practiced included currency boards, fixed pegs to a basket, 
crawling pegs, managed float and free float. Currently, three countries are members of 
ERMII: Estonia and Lithuania with a fixed rate as a unilateral commitment and Latvia with 
+/-1% fluctuation band as a unilateral commitment. Bulgaria has a currency board 
arrangement with the euro being the anchor currency. The Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Romania are under inflation targeting regimes with free floating exchange rates, while 
Hungary’s inflation targeting is conducted in conjunction with an exchange rate band of +/-
15% against the euro. Before joining the euro area, the exchange rate of Cyprus fluctuated 
within relatively narrow margins, Malta had a fixed rate and Slovenia used to practice a more 
or less managed float.   
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Graph 4. 
 Nominal exchange rate against the ECU/EUR  







































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Eurostat. Values for 2008 assume unchanged 
exchange rate from August 2008 till the end of the year. Note: a rise in the index means nominal 
appreciation.  
 
Graph 5.  
Total economy unit labour cost based real effective exchange rates 




































































Source: Eurostat. Note: A rise in the index means real appreciation. Values for 2007 are 
projected using data up 2007Q3. 
 
This bird’s eye view of the main economic indicators allows us to make a number of 
observations. First, the low starting level of per capita GDP and the associated low level of 
prices, as well as the low initial level of credit are important factors explaining the rapid 
growth of credit and the high rate of inflation in the countries at the bottom of the rankings. 
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This applies both to the Baltic countries and Bulgaria with fixed exchange rates and to 
Romania with floating rate. 
To test this hypothesis, we estimated some panel models for the period of 1998-2006 to 
uncover the determinants of price level convergence in the NMS. The selected specification is 
the following:3
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where  is the price level of private consumption at time t in country i,  i t P, () i t
PPS POP Y ,
) (  is 
per capita GDP at purchasing power standards,  i t i t Y DD , ,  is the share of domestic demand in 
GDP at current prices;   is the nominal interest rate; FIXED i t i , i is a time invariant dummy 
variable for six countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta), and  i t, ε  is 
the error term.  
We found – in line with the literature – that per capita income is indeed the key 
explanatory variable of the price level, and we restricted its parameter to one because we 
could not reject the null hypothesis that it is equal to one. Domestic demand in excess of GDP 
is also a significant explanatory factor. To the extent that credit expansion influences 
domestic demand, and further that the credit expansion is influenced by the initial level of 
credit, the latter is an important factor determining the price level.  
Higher real (and nominal) interest rate compared to the euro area interest rate, which 
influences the inflow of interest rate sensitive capital, is also a factor having significant 
positive effects on the price level, since it can appreciate the nominal exchange rate, leading 
to a rise in the price level relative to the euro area (if the exchange rate pass-through is less 
than perfect). We also found that the fixity of the nominal exchange rate is an additional 
explanatory factor of the price level, but that its significance declines over time, in parallel 
with the convergence of per capita income. This confirms the principle that under fixed 
exchange rate, the price level convergence takes place via higher inflation and as the real 
convergence proceeds, this influence diminishes. However, if the peg contributes to excess 
domestic demand growth, for instance via lower real interest as we discuss it later, then of 
course the peg itself has an (indirect) effect on price level increases and inflation, since the 
parameter of domestic demand is found to be significantly positive. 
 
                                                        
  For details, see Darvas and Szapáry (2008).  3
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Under fixed exchange rate conditions, the price level convergence translates into higher 
domestic inflation. Under floating exchange rates, the price level convergence can be 
accommodated either by higher inflation or by an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, 
or by a combination of the two. The results of the model calculations also show that the 
interest rate sensitive capital inflows can temporarily appreciate the nominal exchange rate 
in excess of what would be required by price level convergence implied solely by the catching-
up of GDP per capita.  
We used the estimated model described above to offer some quantitative prospects of 
future price level convergence and its effect on inflation. To this end, we assumed various 
catching-up scenarios in terms of GDP per capita, and assumed that domestic demand and 
the interest rate converge to EA12 levels as the catching-up process levels out. We further 
assumed that the catching-up, that is, the excess growth of GDP compared to EA12, is fast 
when a country has a much lower per capita GDP than the EA12, but that the speed decreases 
with the advance of the catching-up process.  
The long run level of per capita GDP was set either at 90 percent of EA12 level (roughly 
the average of Greece, Portugal and Spain) or at 100 percent. The initial speed of catching-up 
was set equal to actual excess growth in 2000-2007. Projections of domestic demand per 
GDP were derived on the basis of an empirical relationship between excess growth and 
domestic demand. We assumed that the interest rate differential will be zero by 2015 and 
declines (increases in the case of the Czech Republic where the interest rate is currently 
below euro level) linearly in time till then. For illustrative purposes, Table 1 shows the 
inflationary consequences of the price level convergence under these assumptions. For 
instance, assuming a price level convergence of 90% in the long run, the excess inflation over 
EA12 inflation ranges between 1,2% and 3.6% per year during 2008-20012. This excess 
inflation can be also accommodated by a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate of the 
same magnitude, or by a combination of excess inflation and appreciation.  




Projected annual average price level convergence 














Bulgaria  1.2 1.8 1.8 1.2 2.0 2.0 
Cyprus n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Czech Republic  2.5  0.9 0.3 3.0 1.6 0.8 
Estonia  3.3 0.0 -0.3 4.3 0.9 0.0 
Hungary  3.2 1.9 1.3 3.3 2.2 1.6 
Latvia  2.3 0.5 -0.1 2.6 1.3 0.5 
Lithuania  3.4 1.2 0.3 3.8 1.9 0.9 
Malta  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Poland  1.8 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.4 
Romania  2.7 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.5 
Slovenia n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 1.6 0.4 0.1 
Slovakia  3.6 1.6 0.7 3.8 2.2 1.2 
Note: The interpretation of the values shown is the following: either inflation will exceed the 
EA12 inflation rate by the magnitudes shown, or the nominal exchange rate should 
appreciate by these same magnitudes, or a combination of these two factors should occur. 
 
A second observation is that the significant appreciation of the real effective exchange 
rates inherent in the catching-up process is not dependent on the exchange rate regime, 
although the regime can determine the risks of overshooting of the real exchange rate as it 
will be discussed later. 
A third observation is that in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and, more recently, in Poland 
and Romania, the real exchange rate appreciation has been accompanied by a significant 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.  The first three countries are also among those 
which have had the lowest average inflation rate in the more recent period of 2004-2007, and 
Romania has seen its inflation rate decline rapidly. In other words, the price level 
convergence has been accompanied by a lower inflation rate when the nominal exchange rate 
was let to appreciate, a finding which is confirmed by the above mentioned model 
calculations.   
Fourth, the faster rate of growth in the less developed NMS except Bulgaria has been 
largely driven by consumption rather than productivity gains which, together with 
investment growth and despite rapid increase in exports, has led to large current account 
deficits. This means that the catching up of these countries has been largely at the cost of 
accumulating foreign debt. Fiscal looseness has not been the source of the large current 
account deficits of these countries. These countries have recorded surpluses or deficits of less 
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then one per cent of GDP per year on average during 2004-2007. Only Romania had an 
average deficit of 2% per year in that period.  
Finally, the Baltic countries and especially Estonia are fast catching up to the countries in 
midfield in terms of per capita GDP, but Bulgaria and Romania, which started the catching-
up process only in around 2000, are still farther behind. This suggests that the price level 
convergence due to the catching up-process should moderate in the Baltics, but that it will be 
still a significant source of future inflationary pressure in Bulgaria and Romania. 
 These observations indicate that the starting level and the speed of real convergence, as 
well as the exchange rate regime have a bearing on the challenges facing the new members in 
meeting the nominal convergence criteria for euro adoption and, as a consequence, on the 
choice of strategies to adopt on the road to the euro and on the timing of euro adoption.  
  
2.3. MONETARY TRANSMISSION: LIMITS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DOMESTIC 
MONETARY POLICY 
 
The relevance of the monetary transmission mechanism from the perspective  of euro 
adoption is that when the effects of domestic monetary policy on inflation and output are 
large and very different from the effects observed in the euro area, then the cost of loosing 
monetary policy independence might be significant. In the opposite case, the loss is less 
important.   
There are characteristics of the NMS that limit the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
general, and factors that limit the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy in particular. 
 Two characteristics limit the effectiveness of monetary policy in general. First, the ratio 
of credit to GDP is still low in these countries, ranging between around 41% for Poland and 
less than 76% for the other CEEs except in Latvia (110%) and Estonia (95%), compared with 
an average of about 135% in the euro area (Graph 3). In the latter two Baltic countries, the 
credit to GDP has increased very sharply in recent years.  Second, stock market capitalization 
i s  l o w   a n d  h o l d i n g s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  b y  h o u s e h o l d s  i s  s m a l l ,  w h i c h  b o t h  w e a k e n  t h e  
channels through balance sheets and wealth effects.   
More relevant from the perspective of euro adoption and the surrender of monetary 
policy independence are the factors that already constrain the effectiveness of domestic 
monetary policy. The main factor is the large and growing share of foreign currency loans 
(Table 2), which weakens the effectiveness of domestic interest rate policy. Among the 
countries with floating exchange rates, the share of foreign currency loans reached 45% in 
Hungary and 48% in Romania  in 2006 due to the high positive spreads between the 
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domestic and the relevant foreign interest rates. In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, 
where the interest rate spreads are negative, the share is only 10%.   
The shares are highest in the Baltic States, ranging between 52% in Lithuania and 77% in 
both Estonia and Latvia. In the latter country, the interest rate spreads have widened recently 
and 100% of the recent growth of loans has been in euro. In Bulgaria, at 44%, the share is 
also high. Since these countries have pegged exchange rates, the high share of foreign 
currency loans does not any more add significantly to the loss of monetary policy 
independence, but does represent a substantial risk if the exchange rate will depreciate for 
some reason. 
Another factor circumventing the domestic monetary policy is the borrowing by firms 
from their mother companies abroad or from other sources of external lending. According to 
World Bank (2007b), the foreign debt stock of enterprises exceed the level of their domestic 
bank loans in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Estonia. Since foreign-
owned firms have easier access to external sources of lending and since they contribute 
considerably to output in the NMS, the share of external financing is a significant limiting 
factor on the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy, which is also one reason why the 
level of domestic credit is low.  
 
Table 2.  
Share of foreign currency loans (in percent of total loans), 2004-2006 
   Households 
Non-financial 
corporations Total 
    2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006 
Bulgaria  12 17 n.a. n.a. 47 46
Czech Republic  0.3  0.2 18.7 18.6 11.2  10.2
Estonia  64.9 77.8 78.7 75.6 72.1 76.7
Cyprus  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Latvia  65.1 77.1 56.3 77.0 59.8 77.0
Lithuania  42.8 43.9 64.8 58.2 58.0 52.3
Hungary  12.9 42.7 43.4 45.7 31.9 44.5
Malta  1.0 1.4 6.7 16.1 4.3 9.4
Poland  27.2 30.9 23.7 22.1 25.4 27.1
Romania  47 40 n.a. n.a. 61 48
Slovenia  3 43 n.a. n.a. 32 57
Slovakia 0.6  1.7 33.5 33.5 21.5  20.1
Sources: ECB, World Bank (2007b). 
Note: Calculated on the basis of outstanding amounts at the end of the period. 
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        2.4. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
 
Financial integration enhances risk pooling and consumption smoothing, improves the 
effectiveness of the transmission of the common monetary policy and, through the pooling 
and channelling of resources to investment opportunities, improves the allocation of 
r e s o u r c e s .  H e n c e ,  i t  p r o m o t e s  g r o w t h  a n d  h e lps adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. Financial 
integration is usually measured by the integration of money, bond and equity markets, cross-
border holdings of financial assets, the cross-border integration of banking systems, and 
whether the institutional setups ensure a common set of rules and provide equal access and 
treatment of market participants (Ferrando et al, 2004).  By adopting the acquis 
communautaires, the NMS by and large satisfy the institutional requirements.  
Regarding the integration of money and bond markets, Graphs 6 and 7 show, 
respectively, the 3-month money market rates and the ten-year bond market interest rates. 
There has been a substantial convergence of the nominal interest rates in the NMS towards 
the lower levels prevailing in the euro area. This convergence has been driven in part by the 
decline is risk premia, reflecting the more stability oriented macroeconomic policies in the 
NMS and market expectations that they will adopt the euro following a relatively short period 
of time after their entry into the EU. In addition, the search for yields in the environment of 
abundant global liquidly has increased the markets’ risk appetite, generating substantial 
portfolio capital inflows into many of the NMS. The spreads are particularly low in Estonia, 
Lithuania and Bulgaria which operate fixed exchange rate regimes. In the Czech Republic, the 
spreads are actually negative, consistent with the appreciating exchange rate and 
expectations for further appreciations.  
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Graph 6. 





















































Source: Eurostat. Values for 2008 assume unchanged interest rate from July 2008 till the 
end of the year. 
 
Graph 7.  






































































Sources: Eurostat and ECB. Values for 2008 assume unchanged interest rate from July 2008 
till the end of the year. 
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With respect to the cross-border integration of the banking systems, it is substantial in 
the NMS, owing to the very important share of foreign-owned banks in the total assets of the 
banks, except in Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. In the other countries, it ranges from about 
60% in Latvia and Romania to over 90% in Estonia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (World 
Bank, 2007b). The high shares in the CEEs are a result of the privatization of banks to 
strategic foreign investors and of letting in foreign banks to set up new banks. This was a way 
of infusing capital into the domestic banking system and was seen as transferring 
management know-how, especially in risk analysis and risk management, as well as bringing 
in new financial products.     
   
3. RISKS, CHALLENGES AND LONG TERM STRATEGIES4
3.1 CAPITAL FLOWS: SEVERAL RISKS 
 
The NMS have experienced considerable net capital inflows in the form of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), portfolio capital, and capital of other nature. F D I  h a s  g o n e  i n t o  t h e s e  
countries to exploit profitable investment opportunities. The intensity of FDI has depended 
on such factors as the pace of privatization, the evolution of the legal and institutional 
environment and the absorbing capacity in the individual NMS. It has been also influenced 
by the macroeconomic situation and prospects in both the originating and recipient 
countries. Although at times FDI inflows can experience big swings from one year to another, 
from a macroeconomic stability point of view these swings constitute less of a risk, since they 
can mostly be anticipated and thus better handled.  
The more serious risks lie in the non-FDI capital flows which are sensitive to risk premia 
and interest rate differentials. Most NMS have experienced strong non-FDI capital inflows 
which have been driven by the initially higher domestic nominal interest rates and the 
expectation of yield convergence ahead of euro adoption, as well as by the favourable growth 
prospects.  In the countries with floating exchange rates, the inflows have been at times 
reinforced by expectations that policy makers will not fully counteract the nominal 
appreciation of the exchange rate caused by these very capital inflows because of their 
concern with inflation. In many NMS, the problem has been compounded by the foreign 
currency borrowings driven by strong domestic demand for credit. Boosted by such 
                                                        
4 In this Chapter, we analyze the challenges and strategies of euro adoption from a long term 
perspective. We do not examine the possible effects of the current sub-prime crisis on euro 
adoption strategies. While this crisis can of course affect the size and direction of capital 
flows, the magnitude of exchange rate fluctuations, the extent of credit growth and therefore 
the speed of real convergence, it does not basically change the long-term challenges and 
strategies of euro adoption during the catching-up process as analyzed in this Chapter. 
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borrowings, the non-FDI net capital inflows have been especially large in countries with fixed 
exchange rates, representing about 30% of GDP in Latvia, over 15% in Lithuania and about 
20% in Estonia in 2006-2007. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia with floating 
rates, these inflows have been significantly smaller. Romania, in contrast, had large yield 
differentials which boosted capital inflows. In Hungary, where the yield differential has been 
also large, the non-FDI capital inflows mostly took the form of portfolio investment into 
government securities.  
The danger in such large inflows of capital is that they boost domestic demand and lead to 
large current account deficits and high inflation. They can also put undue upward pressure 
on the exchange rates of countries with floating rate regimes, threatening an erosion of 
competitiveness that might force the authorities to lower interest rates to levels inconsistent 
with the goal of price stability and/or forcing them to undertake costly interventions. 
Another danger of large portfolio capital inflows is that they can have the pervasive effect 
of making policy makers believe that the willingness of investors to buy and hold domestic 
financial assets is a vote of confidence, delaying needed reforms and letting the authorities 
indulge in policies that are clearly unsustainable. A case in point is that of Hungary, where 
despite fiscal deficits ranging between 6% to 9.2% of GDP and similarly high current account 
deficits during 2002-2006, non-resident holdings of government securities have increased. 
By virtue of the mere size of the potential portfolio shifts relative to the small size of the 
capital markets of the NMS, a reversal of capital, due to loss of confidence or contagion, can 
trigger large destabilizing movements in the exchange rates and domestic interest rates. 
Hungary has experienced such sudden shifts in 2003 and again in 2006 when doubts arose 
about the policy intentions of the authorities.  
3.2 DANGER OF CREDIT BOOMS AND OVERHEATING: THE GREAT CHALLENGE 
 
The rapid expansion of credit and the consequent danger of overheating and inflation is one 
of the greatest challenges facing the NMS, irrespective of whether they are members or not of 
the euro area. Both demand and supply factors combine to boost credit expansion.  
On the demand side, the initial low level of credit and of indebtedness, the rapid output 
growth, the rise in income expectations and the stronger confidence boosted also by EU entry 
have led to a greater willingness of economic agents to take on debt. This has been 
particularly true for households. The demand for credit has been fuelled by the sharp decline 
in real interest rates. The  fall in risk premia and the convergence of domestic interest rates 
toward euro levels driven by the inflow of convergence capital buoyed by euro area entry 
expectation, together with higher inflation owing to the BS effect or other reasons, have 
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produced very low or even negative domestic real interest rate5. This environment of low 
borrowing cost has been compounded in several countries by the use of foreign currency and 
external loans as mentioned above.       
On the supply side, the development of the banking sector after privatization and the 
predominance of foreign banks increased the lending capacity of banks. At the same time, 
rising competition among banks to expand their activity in the household sector once the 
corporate sector has been saturated, together with the narrowing of  margins due to the fall in 
interest rates,  have constituted strong incentives for banks to lend to households to maintain 
profitability.  
The fastest growing segments of the credit market have been household loans, in 
particular mortgage loans (Graph 8). The latter have been also encouraged by deregulation in 
the property market and by the rapid rise in property prices and the expectation of further 
price increases which have encouraged speculative buying, including by non-residents. Just 
like total domestic credit, the credit to households has also risen the fastest in the five less 
developed NMS, i.e., the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania, where the starting levels of 
credit were the lowest.  
Several studies have made estimates of the equilibrium level of credit in the CEEs looking 
at explanatory variables, such as per capita GDP, real interest rate, inflation, a proxy for 
financial liberalization, etc (Schadler et al 2005; Kiss et al., 2006; Égert et al., 2006; World 
Bank, 2007b).  A common finding of these studies is that credit in the CEEs is generally 
below equilibrium levels, highlighting the potential for further rapid expansion of credit. 
However, the speed at which the equilibrium level of credit is reached matters for 
macroeconomic stability.6  From the perspective of inflationary pressure, it is not the level 
but the rate of growth of credit that matters.   
 
                                                        
5 Relevant data are provided in Darvas and Szapáry (2008). 
6 Égert et al. (2006) estimate that credit in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia 
have approached the estimated equilibrium level. 
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Graph 8.  











































































Source: Eurostat.  
Note: Data is available till June 2007. Values shown for 2007 assume that the growth rate of 
loans from June to December 2007 is the same as from December 2006 to June 2007.  
 
Several dangers emanating from excessive credit growth must be reckoned with. First, it 
feeds inflation and wage growth that can erode competitiveness not only in countries with 
fixed exchange rates, but also in countries with floating rates, if the demand for credit 
generated external capital continues to flow in and place upward pressure on the exchange 
rate. The rates of inflation, after falling in all new members since the mid-1990s, have picked 
up speed in recent years, in particular in the Baltic States and Bulgaria, and also in Hungary 
for the specific reasons mentioned earlier (Graph 9). In the four former countries, nominal 
wage growth has also risen significantly and unit labour costs, particularly in Latvia, have 
increased at a very rapid pace in recent years.  
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Graph 9.  



































































Sources: Eurostat (HICP) and IMF, IFS (CPI).  
Note: Annual average change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP) since 1997, 
CPI for 1995-1996. For Bulgaria, change in HICP is available only since 1998. Values for 
2008 are the average of January-July 2008 over the average of January-July 2007 
 
A point to emphasize here is that if the risk premium is not rising, either because a hard 
peg is credible, such as may be under currency boards in the Baltics and Bulgaria, or because 
of the perspective of euro area entry in the case of floating exchange rates, then the credit 
boom and the consequent rise in inflation further lower the level of real interest rates.  In this 
way, the interest rate acts in a pro-cyclical fashion, giving further impetus to credit 
expansion. Since the higher inflation takes place essentially in the non tradable sector, the 
lowest real interest rates will prevail in that sector, channelling the resources away from the 
tradable sector.  This mechanism will continue to apply also once a country has joined the 
euro area. 
Second, the rapid growth in mortgage credit can lead to sharp rises in house prices in real 
terms. Égert and Mihaljek, (2007) report real house price increases of between 20% and 30% 
per year in Estonia and Lithuania during 2000-2006. In the other NMS for which they report 
data, the house price increases have remained more modest, but if mortgage credit continues 
t o  e x p a n d  a t  a  f a s t  r a t e ,  h o u s i n g  p r i c e  b u b b les might well develop. Such bubbles might 
further boost credit expansion by increasing the value of collaterals. During credit booms, the 
risks generally rise because banks become willing to lend to less creditworthy customers, 
exposing the banks to heavy losses when the bubbles burst. 
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Graph 10.  



















































































































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Eurostat. 
Note: there are two columns for each country (except Romania and Malta): the left one refers 
to 1997-2001 and the right one to 2002-2006. Countries are ordered (within both country 
groups) according to their average GDP growth rates in the 2002-2006 period. The average 
GDP growth rate is the sum of the four components shown. 
 
Third, the rapid expansion of credit has fuelled consumption. As can be seen from Graph 
10, the contribution of private consumption to GDP growth has increased in all NMS between 
1997-2001 and 2002-2006, except in Poland and Slovenia. The problem with the rapid 
growth of consumption is that it keeps savings low and increases the investment-saving gap. 
The five less developed NMS where credit expansion has been the fastest have recorded very 
large current account deficits, ranging from about 15% in Estonia to about 24% in Latvia in 
2007 (Graph 11).   In Bulgaria and Romania, a large part of the deficits have been financed by 
FDI, as these countries have attracted foreign investment with the prospect of EU entry. In 
contrast, in the Baltic countries, most of the deficits have been financed by debt, principally 
foreign borrowing by banks and enterprises. External debt levels have increased sharply, 
especially in Latvia where it reached over 110% of GDP in 2006.  When the counterpart of 
indebtedness is consumption and housing loans, it means that resources are diverted away 
from investment in the tradable sector, which is bound to negatively affect competitiveness 
and growth down the road. 
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Graph 11.  








































































Sources: 1995-2006 Eurostat, 2007-2008 EC Economic forecast autumn 2007.  
Note: the scaling of the vertical axis is different for the three panels. 
         
Graph 12.  










































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Note: 2008 values refer to January-April 2008. 
 
External competitiveness has become a cause for concern in countries where wages and 
unit labour cost have risen sharply in recent years and where, as a result, the real effective 
exchange rates have also increased considerably. Competitiveness could be an issue in 
Estonia, where the export market share has been slightly declined in recent years (Graph 12) 
and the current account deficit has ballooned. In Romania, after very rapid growth between 
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2000 and 2004, the market share stagnated in 2005-2006 and temporarily fell in 2007. In 
Slovenia, the market share has been stagnating over the past decade, but Slovenia has 
recorded only modest current account deficits. The fact that export volume growth has been 
robust and export market shares have increased in most of the NMS would indicate that the 
main cause of the large current account deficits is excessive domestic demand rather than 
any significant loss of competitiveness.  
It is not known at what level of current account deficit foreign capital will retrench in the 
current environment of weakening but still relatively high risk appetite and euro area entry 
expectation. Such high deficits clearly increase the exposure of countries to capital flow 
reversal. EU membership and euro area entry prospects have so far provided a protective 
shield, allowing countries to finance current account deficits of a size that would have not 
been possible without such shield. Surely there are limits to the indulgence of the markets. 
Financial crises have often been preceded by rapid credit growth to the private sector, strong 
real effective exchange rate appreciation and large current account deficits.  
The banking sectors in the NMS are in a relatively healthy position currently: the non-
performing loans (NPL) are low, the capital adequacy ratios are relatively high (Word Bank, 
2007b) and ownership of local banks by internationally renowned foreign banks is 
considerable. However, none of these is insurance against a crisis occurring. The low level of 
NPLs today does not mean that the current loan portfolio will not worsen in the future, 
particularly in view of the large share of foreign currency loans.  If there is a reversal of 
capital, borrowers in foreign currency will face higher payment obligations due to a 
depreciation of the domestic currency. While companies producing for exports have a natural 
hedge, firms producing for the domestic market and households do not posses such safety 
net. Local currency borrowers will also face higher payment obligations due to a rise in 
interest rates. In the household sector, defaults on mortgage loans could occur and 
consumption would be negatively affected. Through balance sheet effects, banks would 
tighten credit, further impacting negatively growth. 
For this scenario to happen, the depreciation of the exchange rate would have to be 
significant and durable, an event that cannot be altogether excluded if there was a shift in 
global market sentiment. If many defaults occurred, the stability of the banking system could 
ultimately be affected. Capital adequacy ratios could rapidly deteriorate if there were a 
significant growth in NPLs and there is no guarantee that the foreign mother banks will want 
to inject additional capital, especially if they themselves face difficulties back home, such as 
many do now in the wake of the sub-prime debacle.  
All these militate in favour of raining in the growth of credit and reducing the excessive 
current account deficits before it is too late. At the same time, the bank regulatory and 
supervisory structures should be strengthened as much as possible. The NMS have made 
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great progress in this area over the years, but experience shows that the vigilance is never 
enough. In particular, the cooperation between home and host country supervision should be 
improved and strengthened for which the EU framework provides good opportunity.  
3.3 FOREIGN CURRENCY LOANS: HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM? 
 
Several old and new EU members have applied administrative and regulatory measures to 
slow down the growth of credit and to limit unhedged foreign currency loans. World Bank 
(2007b) provides a list of such measures introduced. Administrative measures may include 
limits on the growth of foreign currency loans or on the ratio of such loans to the banks’ own 
c a p i t a l .  R e g u l a t o r y  m e a s u r e s  t y p i c a l l y  a i m  a t  r a i s i n g  t h e  c o s t  o f  b o r r o w i n g  b y  i m p o s i n g  
tighter rules on foreign currency loans. These may include special reserve requirements and 
lower interest rate paid on those reserves, tighter provisioning and assets qualification rules, 
stricter non-price requirements (e.g., higher down payment, additional collateral), higher 
capital requirement or other measures applied to foreign currency borrowings. 
The problem with such measures is that if they are maintained for a long time, they will 
distort markets and weaken competition. Furthermore, they can be evaded by switching from 
domestic to direct borrowing from abroad, a technique made easier in countries where 
foreign owned banks play a dominant role. They can also reroute financing from bank to non-
bank channels, such as leasing, and can encourage foreign banks to switch from subsidiaries 
to branches, a channel less supervised by the local authorities. On the whole, the effectiveness 
of such measures is questionable in the long run and can best serve as a short term expedient 
to slow excessive credit expansion when the economy overheats. The authorities may also use 
moral suasion on banks, although its effectiveness is uncertain. 
There are other ways that can slow down the growth of household mortgage credit which 
are less distorting overall because they would be specifically aimed at this fast expanding 
market in the NMS. The most effective would be a tax on interest payment on mortgage 
credit and a comprehensive real estate tax on housing, which could be reinforced by a     
mandatory reduction in the loan to value ratio. Where they exist, the tax deduction on the 
interest paid on mortgage debt should be eliminated. Such measures have been successfully 
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3.4 FISCAL POLICY: NOT A FULL SUBSTITUTE TO DEAL WITH THE MONETARY 
POLICY SHOCK 
 
In view of the loss of monetar y  p o l i c y  a u t o n o m y  i n  t h e  N M S  u n d e r  f i x e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  
arrangement and the constraints on monetary policy independence in the countries operating 
under floating rate regimes, fiscal policy plays a key role as a stabilizing policy during the 
run-up to euro and thereafter. There is no uniform yardstick of what the level of budget 
d e f i c i t s  s h o u l d  b e  i n  t h e  n e w  m e m b e r s .  F r o m  a strictly analytical point of view, it is 
fundamentally a question of debt sustainability. From that perspective, the new members 
with very low debt would have more room for manoeuvre. In addition, as catching up 
economies, the new members have a higher potential growth rate, which implies that to 
maintain the long-run stability of public finances, the NMS with very low debt could run 
higher deficits.  
From a short- to medium-term policy perspective, however, these long term analytical 
considerations will have to take a back seat in circumstances where fiscal policy needs to be 
in a position to counteract the demand pressures emanating from the interest rate shock. The 
appropriate fiscal stance will depend on the intensity of inflationary pressures and the degree 
of overheating.  One must be realistic though about the extent to which fiscal policy can be 
used to counteract inflationary pressures due to excessive credit expansion and price level 
c o n v e r g e n c e .  L a g s  i n  t he  i m p a c t  o f f i s c a l  m e a s u r e s ,   7 the difficulty of assessing the right 
timing of policy intervention, the irreversibility of some actions and the reluctance of 
politicians to cut back on discretionary public spending all inhibit the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy as a tool to cool overheating. Furthermore, because of the import leakage, large fiscal 
contractions would be needed in small open economies to get a significant impact on output 
or inflation. 
  The situation is compounded in the NMS by the fact that despite higher output 
volatilities, the cyclical sensitivity of the budgets is lower in the NMS than in the EU15 
(European Commission, 2006b). This is because of the smaller share of cycle sensitive direct 
taxes and unemployment expenditures. The low share of direct taxes is due in part to tax 
holidays and the low level of corporate taxes which have been used to attract FDI. The 
relatively large share of the black economy and tax evasion are contributing factors. The 
smaller share of expenditures on unemployment is generally due to the less generous 
benefits. This means that these countries would  ha ve  t o  re l y  on  e ve n m o r e  d is c re t io n a r y 
changes to affect output and inflation.  The same situation will apply after euro area entry, 
increasing the burden on other policies.  
                                                        
7 Deroose et al. (2004) find that counter-cyclical budgetary policy actually disrupts the 
adjustment process when the policy lag is 4 quarters.   
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3.5 INCOMES POLICY: SHOULD BE PART OF THE ARSENAL 
 
The factors limiting the use of fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical policy tool heighten the role 
of other instruments to control inflation, namely incomes policy. Wage developments have to 
be supportive of the goal of price stability and consistent with the gains in productivity in 
order to maintain competitiveness. If real wage growth exceeds productivity gains and a 
devaluation of the nominal exchange rate is no more a policy option, the resulting rise in unit 
labour costs and loss of competitiveness will entail a painful adjustment period.  
There are examples of social “pacts” or social “consensus” which have worked well. A 
good example is Austria where the social consensus has been an important pillar of the hard 
currency policy adopted in the early 1970s. Many other countries have resorted with more or 
less success to such pacts in the run-up to euro (Boeri, 2005b). One should not 
underestimate, though, the difficulty of reaching such common understandings in the NMS, 
taking into account the heightened expectations for “wage convergence” and “fair wages” 
accompanying the integration into the EU. What is certain is that governments have a leading 
role to play in promoting wage moderation by clearly communicating to the public the costs 
of excessive wage increases and by signalling through their own public sector wage policy the 
importance they attach to wage moderation. The best solution would be to forge social 
consensus around the goal of entering the euro area that could pave the way for a lasting 
practice after adoption of the euro. 
 
3.6 STRUCTURAL POLICES: FLANKING INSTRUMENTS 
 
Structural reforms are essential in many NMS for achieving lasting fiscal consolidation. One 
of the most important challenge stems from the aging of the population in the CEEs, which 
calls for reforms in the pension and health care systems. It is common wisdom that labour 
and product market flexibility improves the ability to adjust to shocks. Employment 
protection tend to be lower in the NMS than in the euro area (OECD, 2004), but demands for 
greater protection could emerge in the new members, owing to the demonstration effect 
coming from old members with higher employment protection. Governments would be well 
advised to resist such demands. Product market flexibility increases the benefits of labour 
market flexibility and wage moderation. Conway et al. (2005) identify the main areas where 
regulation is high in the ‘Visegrád countries’ and where improvements should be made. These 
are different state controls and barriers to entrepreneurship and investment. 
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There are many other areas where reforms may be needed, such as the provision and 
financing of education, the downsizing of pub l i c  e m p l o y m e n t  o r  m e a s u r e s  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  
losses of and the budgetary subsidies granted to state enterprises. What reforms are needed 
and how they should be implemented vary according to countries and there is no uniform 
recipe.    
It does not seem to be indispensable to start, let alone finish all the necessary structural 
reforms prior to euro adoption, since these reforms take many years to be implemented. 
However, a country preparing for euro adoption should at least have a clear agenda of 
reforms and display a strong commitment to carry them out. Reforms in the pension and 
health care systems need the broad support of the society and mustering such support might 
be easier prior to entering the euro area if there is support in the society in favour of euro 
adoption. On the other hand, if there is strong resistance to such reforms, pushing them as a 
requirement for euro adoption might trigger a backlash against the euro. Each country will 
have to work out its own approach to reforms in light of its circumstances. It is advisable to at 
least initiate some of the most important reforms needed prior to euro adoption because once 
in the euro area, the political will to reform may falter.  
 
4. STRATEGIES AND TIMING FOR EURO ADOPTION 
 
The strategy and timing for euro adoption has to be assessed from two perspectives: (i) what 
does it take to meet the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria, and (ii) whether the 
convergence process can be better managed inside or outside of the euro area. This has to be 
then weighed against the well known benefits of being a member of the monetary union.  
4.1 CHOICE OF MONETARY-CUM-EXCHANGE RATE POLICY: WHICH WAY IS BETTER? 
   
The globalization and integration of financial markets, together with euro area entry 
expectations, have fundamentally altered the environment in which the catching-up process 
has to be managed and in which monetary policy can be operated in the new members. This 
is largely an unprecedented situation. In the initially less developed Western European 
countries, the catching-up proceeded over the years in a less globalized world and a more 
progressive liberalization of capital movements, without the impetus to capital flows fed by 
the anticipation of an early entry into a monetary union. This has provided vastly more room 
for pursuing an independent monetary and exchange rate policy, even as efforts were made 




A key issue is how best to tackle  the inflationary pressures stemming from the combined 
impact of price level convergence associated with the catching-up process and the strong 
boost to domestic demand due to the  financial integration-cum-interest rate shock. A hard 
peg exchange regime such as a currency board arrangement can shield against speculative 
exchange rate fluctuations and provide a more stable environment for small open economies, 
although the recent experience of Latvia is a warning sign that this is not necessarily the case 
even within ERMII.  But as long as the peg is credible and there is little or no exchange risk 
premia, the low domestic interest rates heighten the danger of credit booms and overheating. 
Since countries with hard pegs do not have the possibility of letting the nominal exchange 
rate appreciate to moderate   inflation, the price level convergence associated with the 
catching-up process translates into higher domestic inflation, which pushes the real interest 
rates down into very low or negative level, further fuelling credit expansion and domestic 
demand.  
The inflation targeting regime with floating exchange rates provides more flexibility to 
deal with the inflationary pressures, as the risk premia can give some room for manoeuvre 
and there is the possibility of letting the nominal exchange rate appreciate. The flexibility 
should not be overestimated.  As seen, the risk premia might be small due to euro area entry 
anticipation driven capital inflows and expectations of exchange rate appreciation. 
Furthermore, the tightness of domestic monetary policy can be circumvented by the foreign 
currency loan and the direct external borrowing channels as discussed earlier. Letting the 
exchange rate appreciate to fight inflation might in any case only give a temporary respite if 
the credit boom persists. Once within the euro area, appreciation is not available any more 
and if the underlying inflationary pressures have not been brought under control, inflation 
will raise its head again.  
Furthermore, the risk of capital flow reversal remains significant if strong capital inflows 
driven by interest rate differential places undue upward pressure on the floating exchange 
rate. For instance, in Romania, where the current account deficit exceeds 10% of GDP, the 
capital inflows have strongly appreciated the nominal exchange rate, rendering the country 
vulnerable to capital flow reversal. In Hungary, when macroeconomic imbalances emerged 
because of inappropriate policies, the sudden outflow of capital lead to a sharp depreciation 
of the exchange rate and an increase in interest rate spreads in 2003 and 2006.  
Among the inflation targeters, the Czech Republic has been quite successful so far in 
maintaining high growth, modest inflation and low current account deficit, although inflation 
has picked up recently. Part of the success may lie in the fact that following the exchange rate 
crisis in 1997 and the subsequent recession, inflation expectations got anchored at a low level.  
The appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which has been driven mostly by FDI inflows 
since the interest rate spread is negative, has also helped to keep the level of inflation low. 
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The growth of credit has been moderate despite the low level of interest rates. However, the 
Czech Republic is also among those countries where the ULC based real exchange rate has 
appreciated considerably. In this country, the initial level of prices was low compared to its 
level of per capita GDP, so that the strong appreciation of the real exchange rate can be 
regarded in part as a “correction” of the initial discrepancy. Nevertheless, if the rapid trend 
appreciation persists, it can undermine competitiveness. In Poland and Slovakia, the real 
exchange rates have also appreciated considerably. In the latter country both growth and 
inflation are somewhat higher, while in both countries the current account deficit is larger 
than in the Czech Republic.  
On the whole, these three inflation targeters have managed to record high growth, while 
keeping inflation and the current account deficit under reasonable control. It remains to be 
seen if these achievements can be preserved. 
It may turn out to be a paradox of history that four out of the five new members with the 
lowest initial per capita GDP, i.e., the Baltic countries and Bulgaria, which started out with 
the largest price level gaps to close and the lowest financial depth and hence the greatest 
potential for credit booms, have opted for a fixed exchange rate arrangements on the road to 
euro. These countries do not have the freedom of letting the nominal exchange rate 
appreciate to moderate inflation and have to manage the price convergence with higher 
inflation. This is a difficult task when the price gap to close is large, because it feeds inflation 
expectations and can lead to rapid loss of competitiveness. In fact, market forces have already 
triggered adjustments in the Baltic countries, leading to sharp drops in output growth from 
the high levels of the earlier years. At this point it is still unclear how such boom-bust cycles 
might negatively affect the long-term convergence process of these countries..  
Price level convergence can nevertheless be successfully managed with fixed exchange 
rate under certain circumstances. The hard currency policy adopted in Austria in the early 
1970s, whereby the schilling was fixed to the German mark, is a good example (see 
Hochreiter and Tavlas, 2004). The price level gap to close back then was about 25% in 
Austria (Graph 13), roughly the gap still to be closed in most of the CEEs, but much less than 
the gap that had to be closed when the CEEs started their catching-up process in the mid-
1990s (Graph2). In Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia, however, the gap to be closed is still 50-
30%. The key to success in Austria was a social pact that kept wage growth more or less in 
line with productivity gains and a fiscal policy that was supportive of the hard peg. It is also 
true that Austria’s task was facilitated by the fact that capital liberalization proceeded more 
progressively than in the CEEs and it did therefore not experience the kind of capital inflows 
that has been feeding the credit booms in some of the CEEs. Also, Austria’s banking system 
was more regulated than those in the present day CEEs.  
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Graph 13.  
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Source: Penn World Tables.  
Note: downward movement in the exchange rate indicates nominal 
depreciation. 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion regarding the monetary 
framework best suited to manage the real and nominal convergence on the road to the euro?  
The most important one in our view is that inflation targeters seem to have a better set of 
tools at their disposal than peggers to manage the convergence process on an equilibrium 
path toward euro adoption. The main risk for the targeters is excessive exchange rate 
fluctuations, but if policies are geared to macroeconomic stability, the likelihood of this 
happening is reduced. The more likely danger then is rather excessive appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate, which can force a country into costly intervention or a lowering of 
domestic interest rate that can fuel credit expansion.  
For the peggers, the options are limited. Exiting from the hard peg before euro adoption 
carries the danger of a loss of confidence and a depreciation of the currency, which could 
create a deep recession via negative wealth effects on the debt of households and firms in 
countries where the debt is highly euroized as in the Baltic States. If the exit is well 
communicated as a transitional step toward earlier euro adoption, the recession might not 
occur or would be mild, after which the country would become better positioned to control 
inflation. The danger here is that the nominal exchange rate appreciation could overshoot 
and lead to a loss of competitiveness, or exacerbate an already weak competitive position. 
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Therefore, the risks of exiting from the hard peg should be carefully weighted before 
contemplating such action. A well timed and well prepared step revaluation of the peg could 
be an other option to consider if competitiveness is not at stake. The risks here are the 
positive wealth effects on the euroized debt which would boost demand precisely at a time 
when the current accounts are already very large in these countries.  
 
4.2 MAASTRICHT CRITERIA: ARE THEY SUITABLE FOR THE NEW MEMBERS? 
4.2.1 Inflation criterion: why it should be modified 
 
The inflation criterion states that the inflation rate of the country wishing to join the euro 
area can not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage point the average inflation of the three best 
performing EU Member States in terms of price stability. This criterion will prove hard to 
meet in the near term, especially for the Baltic countries and Bulgaria which have fixed 
exchange rates. Countries might be tempted to resort to techniques - such as a freezing of 
administered prices, a reduction of consumption taxes or a tightening of credit growth by 
various short term expedients - to squeeze in under the reference value. Such behaviour 
would be tantamount to what Szapáry (2000) labelled as the “weighing-in” syndrome:  like 
the boxer who refrains from eating for hours prior to the weighing-in to satisfy the weight 
limit only to consume a big meal thereafter, the candidate country would resort to all sorts of 
techniques in order to squeeze in under the inflation criteria, only to shift gears after it has 
joined the euro area. This can turn out to be counter productive if inflation accelerates after 
euro adoption, due to the relaxation of credit conditions, the unavoidable upward adjustment 
of administered prices and/or because of a reversal of the reduction in consumption taxes for 
budgetary reasons. Such policy would not help the smooth path of convergence. 
There are few options available. One is to postpone euro adoption until a greater degree 
of real and nominal convergence has been achieved. While this might be unavoidable for 
countries with the largest price level gaps and pegged exchange rate, it would deprive some 
others from the benefits of being a member of the monetary union. A way to ease entry into 
euro area for countries which already have achieved the conditions permitting them to 
operate normally in the monetary union would be to change the criterion. It is 
understandable that the inflation criterion was originally defined in terms of the three best 
performers among the potential candidate countries at the time when there did not yet exist a 
European monetary union. It was also natural that the principle of equal treatment was laid 
down since it would have been difficult to negotiate an agreement in any other way. Now that 
the euro area exists, the criterion based on the three best performers including those which 
are not member of the euro area is more difficult to justify on economic grounds. This is true 
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even though it is the policy to exclude from the three best performers the countries where the 
low inflation level is due to special factors and is therefore judged as not sustainable (so far 
only countries with negative inflation have been excluded). 
A reasonable solution would be to define the criterion as the euro area inflation plus 1.5 
percentage points. The economic justification to use the euro area inflation is that this is the 
relevant indicator that contributes to the imported inflation of the new members whose trade 
is essentially with the euro area. Furthermore, this is the indicator that the ECB tries to 
control and it is not logical that the basis for the reference value for the new members should 
be different. The margin of 1.5 percentage points would constitute the room for 
accommodating the “equilibrium” forces of price level convergence. Such modification of the 
inflation criterion would free the decision makers from weighing which best performer 
country’s inflation is sustainable and which best performer’s is not, an exercise that is bound 
to be a source of friction. To discourage “weighing-in” practices, such modification of the 
reference value could be accompanied by increasing the period from one year to two years 
during which the inflation criterion has to be respected. It could be complemented with a 
stricter interpretation of the allowable exchange rate appreciation within this period, which 
a l s o  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  c o m p u l s o r y  l e n g t h  o f  s t a y  i n  E R M I I .  T h e  c l o s e  t o  2 5  p e r c e n t  
appreciation of the exchange rate in Slovakia in ERMII may well turn out to be a practice of 
weighing-in if inflation can not be kept in check by improvements in productivity after euro 
adoption. The modifications proposed would also provide a better perspective for judging 
whether a candidate country can maintain the low level of inflation in a sustainable way when 
an exchange rate appreciation is no more available for moderating inflation.  
           With the enlargement of the European Union, the reference to “equal treatment” as 
the rational for not changing the inflation criterion is also questionable. Between 1970 and 
1990, the lowest inflation rates among the then members of the EU were recorded by 
Germany, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. In the early 1990s when the Maastricht criteria 
were formulated, policy makers presumably wanted the inflation in the other countries to 
converge to the low level of German inflation, while the decision to take the average inflation 
rate of the three countries with the lowest inflation was meant to provide some flexibility. 
Germany was the major trading partner of the then EU members, so that the criterion meant 
that the other countries’ inflation had to converge to the inflation of the major trading 
partner. This made good sense economically. With enlargement, however, the likelihood that 
the three lowest inflation countries will be minor trading partners has considerably 
increased. For March 2008, for instance, the criterion was based on the inflation rates of 
Malta, the Netherlands and Dania, which were the three countries recording the lowest 
inflation during the reference period. The major trading partners were thus left out of the 
definition of the reference value. Because of this, if the criterion is left unchanged, chances 
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are that the principle of equal treatment will not be upheld in many cases. Our proposal to 
take as a reference value the euro area inflation would eliminate this discrimination.   
The impact on the overall inflation of the euro area of the above modification would be 
limited. The total GDP of the 12 new members represented about 8.8% of the combined GDP 
of the 12 old euro area members plus the 12 new members in 2007. With Cyprus, Malta and 
Slovenia already members of the euro area, the share of the other nine countries represents 
7.6%. If in all nine countries the inflation rate would be exactly 1.5 percentage points above 
the euro area HICP, then this would add a mere 0.1 percentage point to the overall inflation 
of the euro area. This has to be compared to the effect when the current rule is applied, which 
is around 0.05. The impact of the proposed modification would thus be only an additional 
0.05. In fact, the actual impact will be less, since the entry of countries is spread out over 
time and it is unlikely that all countries will have the maximum 1.5 percentage points extra 
inflation. The relative importance of the new members’ GDP will rise with the catching-up, 
but the higher inflation associated with the price level convergence will also diminish. Graph 
14 illustrates the difference between the current reference value and our suggestion for 
modification. 
 
Graph 14.  





























































































































































































Average of three smallest EU members (non-negatives only) 
Current reference value = Three smallest + 1.5
Euro Area
Suggested reference value = Euro area + 1.5  
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Eurostat.  
Note: Values shown correspond to ‘12-month average rate of change’ as required by the 
Treaty for assessing the inflation criterion. 
 
4.2.2 Long-term interest rate criterion: not an obstacle 
 
The criterion stipulates that the 10-year interest rate can not exceed by more than 2 
percentage points the average of such interest rates in the three best performing countries in 
terms of price stability. This is meant to test the durability of price stability and its economic 
rational is clear. The only point worth making is that with euro area entry expectation driven 
capital inflows, the convergence of the long-term interest rates has been much stronger than 
the convergence of inflation. For instance, in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania where the 
inflation exceeds the reference value by wide margins, the interest rate criterion is met.  
 
4.2.3 Exchange rate criterion: it makes sense 
 
This criterion stipulates that a candidate country must enter ERMII for at least two years and 
respect the normal fluctuation bands of +/-15% without severe tensions and without 
devaluing against the currency of any other Member State. Countries may choose a smaller 
band or no band at all as a unilateral commitment. This criterion serves as a test of the ability 
of a country to handle shocks with exchange rate stability. 
The commonly formulated criticism in respect of this criterion is that it is inconsistent to 
have both inflation and an exchange rate target. Theoretically this is a correct view. If the 
candidate country is committed to sound macroeconomic policies and it meets or is firmly on 
a path to meet in a sustainable manner the other Maastricht criteria, the most likely scenario 
is that market forces will push toward an appreciation, as was seen in a number of current 
euro area member countries during the run-up to euro. Some appreciation could be 
accommodated even with the above suggested stricter interpretation of the allowable 
appreciation.  
The real issue concerns the choice of the ERMII central rate. Ideally it should be set at an 
equilibrium level, but model calculations would at best give a very wide range of the 
equilibrium exchange rate. The equilibrium exchange rate is a dynamic concept which 
changes over time, particularly in catching-up economies and, unless the misalignment is 
clearly unsustainable, countries are able to adjust to temporary misalignments by ways that 
that the equilibrium exchange rate derived from statistical models is not capable of 
capturing. Given these uncertainties, there are good reasons to set the ERMII central rate at 
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the prevailing market rate. Setting it at a depreciated level compared to the market rate could 
jeopardize meeting the inflation target. Such step should be contemplated only if 
competitiveness were so weak and the current account deficit so large that devaluation was 
clearly needed.  
Setting the central rate at a stronger level than the market rate might make sense under 
circumstances where competitiveness is not seen as a problem, since it can ease inflation 
pressures and also the pressure for appreciation beyond the central rate, if markets expect 
that there will be no further revaluation. The risk in this strategy is that markets may come to 
a different conclusion, namely that the central rate was set at an appreciated level to fight 
inflation and that in order to make sure that the inflation target is met, the authorities will 
resort to a further revaluation. This then would stimulate capital inflows and require costly 
sterilization. Consequently, whether setting an appreciated central rate is the right strategy 
will depend on where inflation and competitiveness stands at the time of ERMII entry and 
what are the prospects.  
If reasonable macroeconomic stability has been achieved, the best bet is to set the central 
rate at the prevailing market rate. It is not surprising that all new members which entered 
ERMII have done so with a central rate set at the rate prevailing at the time of entry. 
The timing of entering ERMII must be carefully chosen. A country should join ERMII 
only if demand management policies are on a firm path toward sustainable price stability and 
a large degree of nominal convergence – in inflation, interest rate and budget deficit – has 
already occurred. A main benefit of ERMII participation is that it can anchor inflation 
expectations so that the latter can work toward stability, relieving the burden on policies. For 
that to take place, markets have to be convinced that the fundamentals of the economy are 
strong and that the authorities are committed to maintain price stability.   
There is also the question of the optimal length of stay in ERMII. The strongest argument 
in favour of not staying longer than the minimum two years required is the risk of an undue 
upward pressure on the exchange rate owing to inflows of convergence capital when policies 
are on a credible path toward euro adoption. The risks are that the markets will speculate on 
an appreciation of the final euro area entry rate, particularly in view of the precedents of 
Ireland, Greece and Slovakia where revaluations took place within ERMII. If the appreciation 
is excessive, it could require costly interventions as was the case for instance in Greece.  
A longer stay is some times suggested on the grounds that it can serve as a discipline 
multiplier helping countries to learn to pursue stability oriented policies and live with 
exchange rate stability. However, ERM’s role of anchoring expectations would only work if a 
country entered it with strong policies in place, which then obviates the need for a longer 
stay. Another argument advanced for a longer stay is that it would allow more time for the 
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exchange rate to find its “equilibrium” level. Under the circumstances of speculative capital 
inflows driven by expectations of convergence or the lack of it, the prospects that the 
exchange rate will find its equilibrium level better by a longer stay in ERMII are not very 
promising. Some current ERMII members may well have to stay much longer in it because 
they will be unable to meet the inflation criterion as fast as they have originally anticipated. 
This is not a strong reason for choosing at the outset to stay in ERMII longer than required. 
Rather, it is an indication that the authorities may have misjudged the speed at which they 
could tame inflation.   
 
4.2.4 Fiscal criteria: the rationale is valid for the new members as well 
 
According to these criteria: (i) the government debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, unless 
the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace; and (ii) the government budget deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP. We have 
discussed earlier the considerations that need to be taken into account when assessing the 
sustainability of the debt. The 60% of GDP debt criterion is hard to argue with. If anything, it 
is too high if one takes into account the contingent liabilities due to the ageing of populations. 
Some academics have argued that the 3% of GDP deficit criterion should be relaxed because 
the stock of public capital is insufficient in the new members and they need to spend more on 
infrastructure development (see for instance Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004). Another 
argument advanced some times is that the implementation of structural reforms, such as for 
instance health care reform, requires to be supported with additional spending. 
While it is true that the NMS need to develop their infrastructure and have to undertake 
structural reforms, they need the room for using the fiscal tool to counteract if necessary the 
overheating coming from strong credit expansion, irrespective of when they adopt the euro. 
Where the debt is high as in Cyprus, Malta and Hungary, they also have to worry about debt 
sustainability.  Now that EU provides grants to help finance infrastructure investment, and 
given the constraints on absorptive capacities, there seems to be little justification of not 
meeting the fiscal criterion on the grounds of the need for infrastructural development. 
Moreover, as catching-up economies, the new members have higher potential growth rate 
and do in fact grow faster than the old members, hence the 3% criterion is less stringent for 
them.   
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4.3 TIMING OF EURO ADOPTION: PUSH FOR EARLY DATE OR WAIT FOR MORE REAL 
CONVERGENCE? 
 
Last but not least, the question of optimal timing of euro adoption has to be addressed. The 
potentially most difficult nominal convergence criterion to satisfy is the inflation criterion. 
This is because the catching up itself means price level convergence that can be achieved by 
either higher inflation or exchange rate appreciation. The authorities’ control in both of these 
areas is limited due to the unrestricted flow of capital and the associated constraints on 
domestic monetary policy.  
Giving up the tool of exchange rate policy can present problems. If the catching-up 
related factors feeding inflation, i.e., the structural price level convergence and the low level 
of financial deepening that drives the demand for credit, are still forcefully present in an 
economy, the loss of the exchange rate policy can lead to boom-bust cycles and derail the 
smooth process of catching up, as the difficulties currently faced by Latvia to cool down an 
overheated economy testifies to it. This is because it seems easier to keep the appreciation of 
the real exchange rate inherent in the catching-up process on a more or less equilibrium path 
by letting the nominal exchange rate to appreciate than by keeping inflation on an 
equilibrium path after giving up all flexibility, however limited it is, of monetary policy 
independence.  If an overheated economy leads to a loss of competitiveness and slow growth, 
it is difficult to regain it by wage and price disinflation after the surrender of monetary policy 
independence within the euro area, as the experience of Portugal has shown. 8
This is not to say that it is easy to keep the nominal exchange rate on an equilibrium 
appreciating path in the current conditions of free movement of capital and globalized 
financial markets. As shown in Darvas and Szapáry (2008), for the small open economies of 
the CEEs, the exchange rate has been more a propagator of shocks than a shock absorber. 
The issue therefore evolves around a proper assessment of the pros and cons of (i) pushing 
for an early euro adoption and face the risks of higher inflation and the need to regain 
competitiveness without the disposal of the exchange rate tool, or (ii) postponing euro area 
membership and its benefits and face the risks of exchange rate instability. Based on our 
analysis, this dilemma can be approached from the perspective of where a country is situated 
in the catching-up process. If the gaps to close in per capita GDP and price level are still fairly 
large and the speed of catching-up is fast, a country will have difficulty in controlling inflation 
                                                        
8 The adjustment experiences of the euro area countries and the lessons for the NMS to learn 
from these experiences are analyzed in detail in European Commission (2006a) The 
experience of Portugal is, in particular, interesting because it has had limited success in 
adjusting to the interest rate shock. When a country looses competitiveness due to high price 




once in the monetary union. Consequently, it might be advisable to postpone euro adoption 




The objective of this paper was to assess the risks and challenges facing the new members on 
the road to the euro and to discuss the strategies for and the timing of euro adoption. The 
starting level of development measured by the per capita GDP and the speed of real 
convergence have important bearings on the challenges faced on the road to the euro and on 
the strategies to be adopted. They also have a bearing on the choice of the timing of euro 
adoption. This is because the countries with the lowest per capita income have the largest 
price level gap to close. They also have the lowest initial credit to GDP ratio and hence the 
greatest potential for credit booms and overheating as credit converges toward its 
equilibrium level.  
What is the optimal level of real convergence prior to joining the monetary union is hard 
to judge ex ante. To an extent, it will depend on the size of the GDP per capita and price level 
gaps remaining. If the gaps to close are still fairly large and the speed of catching-up is fast, a 
country will have difficulty in keeping inflation low once within the euro area.  Consequently, 
it might be advisable to postpone euro adoption until the gaps have narrowed. The timing of 
euro adoption will also depend on how successful the country in question has been in taming 
the forces driving credit expansion, in implementing structural reforms that help increase 
productivity and the overall efficiency of the economy, and in consolidating the fiscal position 
in a sustainable manner.  
It follows from the above that inflation targeting with floating rates is better suited than 
hard pegs to manage the price level convergence for fast catching-up economies. This is 
because in pegged regimes, the price level convergence associated with the  catching-up 
process translates into higher domestic inflation, which pushes the real interest rate into very 
low or negative territory, fuelling credit expansion and domestic demand and adding to the 
inflationary pressure. Under floating exchange rate regime, the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate inherent in the catching-up process can be accommodated by an appreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate rather than solely by higher inflation.  
The difficulties to manage the convergence process under inflation targeting with floating 
exchange rate should not be underestimated either. To keep the nominal appreciation on an 
equilibrium path is a challenging task, given the euro area entry expectation driven 
convergence capital inflows and the risk of capital flow reversal if there is a shift in market 
sentiment. The risks are either undue appreciation if confidence is buoyant or excessive 
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exchange rate fluctuations if confidence falters. Furthermore, the room for manoeuvre of 
monetary policy is constrained by such channels as foreign currency loans and direct 
borrowing from abroad, which circumvent the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. 
These arguments would militate in favour of earlier rather than later euro adoption for 
countries where the degree of real convergence is more advanced.  
Whether under fixed or floating exchange rate regime, the need to implement structural 
reforms which increase the efficiency of the economy as well as those which contribute to the 
long term consolidation of the fiscal accounts can not be enough emphasized. A core 
challenge is to secure robust productivity growth indispensable for the real convergence to 
proceed in a sustained way. Measures which increase the flexibility of labour and product 
markets and increase the ease of doing business are key ingredients of success.  
Social pacts have been successfully used in some countries to keep wage growth in line 
with productivity gains.  The new members could forge such social pacts as a policy to 
facilitate euro adoption, which could then form the basis of a more permanent feature of 
policy once inside the monetary union.   
The inflation criterion as currently defined has lost its economic logic and can prevent the 
adoption of the euro by countries which have already satisfied the conditions permitting 
them to function normally within the monetary union and reap the benefits of euro area 
membership. We suggest that the reference value be defined as the euro level HICP plus 1.5 
percentage points to accommodate the equilibrium price level convergence. This could be 
accompanied by increasing the period from one year to two years during which the inflation 
criterion has to be respected and could be complemented with a stricter interpretation of the 
allowable exchange rate appreciation within this period. Such modifications would provide a 
better perspective for judging whether a candidate country can maintain the low level of 
inflation in a sustainable way once monetary independence has been surrendered. The 
impact of the suggested modification on the overall inflation rate of the euro area would be 
minimal. Furthermore, leaving the inflation criterion unchanged violates the principle  of 
“equal treatment” in an economic sense, since for the countries that introduced the euro in 
1999 the criterion had meant convergence to the inflation rate of the major trading partner, 
while after enlargement the chance that minor trading partners will define the criterion has 
increased substantially.  
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